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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HU'l H CAIN ALLEN,
1

Plaintiff a,nd Respondent,
vs.
Alt'l'HUR A. ALLEN, JR.,

Defe,ndant and Appellant.

)'

l
I

Case No.
11918

Rl£SPONDENT'S
S'l'ATEMENT OF _U'ACTS
We i:mbmit the following statement of additional
facts:
't:1he divorce hearing on October 9, 1968 was handled
a::; a de,fault matter (R. 55, 75). Arthur Allen, however,
was then present and testified as to his income and
assets (R. 62). He agreed to pay $300.00 per month for
alimony and support as minimum toward household
expPnse s for Ruth Allen and her daughters (R. 70).
1

Mrs. Allen testified on October 9, 1968 that she intended to work as soon as she could prepare herself
tR. 72). The monthly house mortgage payment was
agreed to be divided equally after six months on the
assmuption that she would then be employed (R. 73).
;'.\frs. Allen testified at the modification hearing on October 10, 1969 that she had taken a ;joh as a mail clerk
prudence and her financial neros so required.

At the modification hearing Judge Brown heard evidencP of Mrs.
current needs, and lie had before
lum for comparison tlw full transcript of the divorce
hearing ( R. 90) .
ARG UM1£Nr:L1
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUl\1ST ANCES, EITHER IN THE NEEDS OR
AVAILABLE INCOME OF THE WIFE, FROM THE
TIME OF THE DIVORCE DECREE; THUS, THERE
SHOULD BE NO MODIFICATION.

Arthur Allen's sole bone of contention and complaint
is that Ruth Allen had the courage, foresight and diligence to obtain employment, even at a menial type job
·with marginal wages to maintain her household (R. 14,
25). Mr. A llPn sought modification by elimination of
$200.00 per month a1imony. He contendt>d that in becoming employed Mrs. Allen's circumstances had substantially changed.
At the modification hearing, Judge Brown heard
testimony r<:'garding Mrs. Allen's current needs (R. 85,
1£x. 1-P) and her current employment at the University
of Utah, with bi-·weekly take-home pay of $105 (Ii. 80).
The full transe,ript of the divore,e hearing was introduced
at the modification hearing (R. 90). It shows that at
the divorce hearing before Judge Anderson on October
9, 1968 the award of alimony and support was arrived at
by agreement with Mr. Allen, after he was given the full
opportunity to aj)lwar and testif.v, although he '.vas in
default and had failed to n·spond to Mrs. Allt'n's re-

'.)
.)

quests for admissions (R. 55, 75 and
P-1). Mrs.
Allen then testified that she intended to seek employment as soon as she could (R. 73).
Judge Brown thus had before him the current cirnunstances of Mrs. Allen's needs and her available income, together with the full record of the divorce hearing
and the showing of her need and contemplated plans for
em1Jloyment at that prior time. Mrs. Allen testified at
the modification hearing that she became employed eleven
days affor the divorce because of financial necessity (R.
83, 87).
Judge Brown denied Mr. Allen's petition for modification, finding that there had been no material change
of circumstances on Mrs. Allen's part, saying in his
Memorandum Decision (R. 25) :
''Certainly the Court at the hearing of the divorce
could not have intended that an award of $200
alimony and $100 child support would remotely
allow the plaintiff to live in the manner she had
become accustomed as the wife of a successful
attorney, but rather the award did contemplate
plaintiff augmenting her support and alimony by
mnployrnent. Since plaintiff's wages are marginal,
it would not be considered that her employment
is such a substantial change in the material circnmstances of the parties as to warrant a modification of the original decree."

Watts v. Watts, 21 Utah 2d 306, 445 P.2d 141, inrolved a factual situation clo,sely analogous to that of
the AllL·ns. Mrs. \Vatts obtain0d a se(·retarial job shortly
after the
and Mr. \Vatts asked modification to

4
terminate the alimony because of changed cireunu.;tances.
Mr. \Vatts was financially involved, and this Uourt held
that jt would be unconscionable to allow such modification in favor of a known defaulter.
Mrs. Allen, like Mrs. Watts, ·wa:s gallantly trying
to make the best of a known Lad situation. At the modification hearing Mrs. Allen testified that she obtained
employment becau:se she knew that ''there were a couple
of judgments against Arthur" (R. 87), that Mr. Allen
had apparently been unable to pay a hospital bill (R.
83, 87) and that an oil company credit card had been
taken back (R. 83). Mr. Allen was admittedly threB
months delinquent in afunony payment::; at the time of
the modifieatiou hearing (R. 86).
20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d
180, held that ''An application for a modification should
be Sl1Ljected to thorough scrutiny by the court," and
that the husband petitioner cannot contribute to the
ground::> for whieh modification is :songht. Judge Brown
gave the Allen modification the most thorough scrutiny,
and he concluded that Mr::>. Allen'::; need for employment
and intention to :seek :such was known at the time of the
divorce (R 25). Her taking employment thereafter was
no change of ·which Mr. Allen could take unfair advantage.
Huren::wn ·vs.

ln his petition for modification Mr. Allen made tlll'
illusory and '''orthles:s offer tliat if Mrs. Allen would
terminate tlu· alimony of $200 per 1110nth, or if the Court

would modify the decree accordingly, Mr. Allen would
voluntarily continue the $100 per month support for the
daughter Dorothy for two years after she reached age
eighteen ( R. 15).
The decree awarded custody of Dorothy, then age
sixteen, and support of $100 per month for Dorothy to
Mrs. Allen (R. 12). Support was in no way limited to
the period of Dorothy's minority, and we submit that
Mr. Allen is bound to support Dorothy under the divorce
decree and the effects of Sections 78-45-2 and 3, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, until she reaches age twenty-one.
Any magnanimous offer to pay within these already
fixed legal bounds was indeed specious and false.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT THOROUGHLY SCRUTINIZED
THE GROUNDS FOR MODIFICATION. ITS FINDINGS SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED.

Judge Brown had before him at the modification
hearing the proof of Mrs. Allen's current needs and her
current income. He reviewed the full record of the divorce hearing and found by this comparison no material
change of circmnstances to warrant any modification.
The scrutiny of the grounds for modification as demanded by the Sorenson case, supra, was complete and
thorough.
rrhe Utah Supreme Court on numerous ocoosions
has held that the trial court's findings of fact should no t
be distmbed unless evidence clearly preponderates
against the findings. Stone v. Stone, 19 Utah 2d 378, 431
1

P.2d 802. Chri.stC11sen v. Chri.sten.sen, 21 Utah 2d 263
444 P.2d 511, held that the trial court's findings in di-'
vorce case8 should not be up8et unless they are clearly
unconscionable.
Good conscience and fair play should reward the
courage and diligence of Mrs. Allen in seeking employment, rather than allow Mr. Allen to avoid the family
obligations after a marriage of twenty-three years.
CONCLUSION
'l'here ·was no change of circumstance8 because of
l\fr8. Allen's beeoming employed, where such was contemplated at the time of the divorce decree and where
such employment was clearly necessary. '.L1he trial court's
scrutiny of the facts was thorough.
The denial of the petition for modification and the
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Hespectf ully submitted,
JAMES W. BELESS, JR.
1001-5 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Respondent

